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1 Introduction 
In February 2005 the Kyoto-Protocol entered into force, more than seven years 
after it had been negotiated. One reason for the delay is that a hurdle had to be 
overcome. It was agreed in Kyoto that the protocol would not become binding 
unless ratified by a minimum number of 55 countries that include Annex I 
countries
1
 responsible for at least 55 percent of the emissions of greenhouse gases 
of all Annex I countries in 1990.
2
 Similar requirements, called „minimum 
participation rules‟ (MPRs), are very common in international environmental 
agreements (IEAs).
3
 Rutz (2001) examined a sample of 122 IEAs and found that 
almost all (98 percent) contained some kind of participation clause. 
As the abatement levels agreed in the Kyoto-Protocol are only binding until the 
end of 2012, negotiations about a post-Kyoto agreement will take place in 
December 2009 in Copenhagen. So far there is at least a consensus that in 
Copenhagen a new multilateral agreement with country-specific commitments to 
further reduce greenhouse gas emissions is aimed at. Our paper contributes to the 
discussion about optimal international policy coordination in general and the issue 
of an MPR for a post-Kyoto agreement in particular. 
IEAs are set up to control transnational spillovers. By their very nature IEAs have 
to be self-enforcing, meaning that countries decide voluntarily to join the 
agreement or not. Spillovers imply that, even though countries can reap some 
gains from cooperation, there are strong incentives to free-ride on an agreement 
and unilateral action is inefficient. In the case of greenhouse gases, a failure to 
establish a sufficiently large (and effective) coalition may even trigger 
catastrophic risks (Stern et al. 2007, IPCC 2007).  
The design of the agreement is important to overcome the problem of free-riding 
at the ratification stage. Our paper focuses on MPRs as a very common and 
potentially successful tool to increase IEA participation. MPRs can be designed in 
different ways. They can be linked to the number of signatory countries
4
, to 
country characteristics (such as baseline emissions), contributions (such as an 
abatement target) or to combinations of these. In the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, 
                                                 
1
 Given by the UNFCCC definition from 1992. 
2
 Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol.  
3
 The recent literature on IEAs has been surveyed by Barrett (2003, 2007), Carraro and Marchiori 
(2003) and Finus (2003 and 2008). 
4
 In this paper, the term signatories refers to sovereign states that have ratified the agreement.  
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a twofold MPR rule has been implemented (55 countries representing 55 % of 
emissions).  
We analyse the formation of an IEA as a coalition formation game with 
heterogeneous countries. We assume that each country is free to decide whether or 
not to join a unique IEA. Put more technically, we analyse a cartel formation 
game with open membership. We examine both, the choice of an MPR and its 
effects on equilibrium coalition formation among countries in this model. Our 
approach follows seminal work by Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) 
and Barrett (1994) who have proposed a sequential game where a transboundary 
pollution game at the second stage is preceded by a cartel formation game at the 
first stage.
5
 Recently Carraro et al. (2009) have proposed an extension of this 
approach to study the endogenous choice of an MPR. A drawback of the analysis 
of Carraro et al. (2009) is that it relies on the assumption of identical countries. 
Our paper relaxes this assumption. We analyse a model with heterogeneous 
countries and we allow for transfers between coalition members that can be used 
to set incentives for participation. Following Carraro et al. (2009) we use a 3-stage 
game. First, there is a unanimous decision on the MPR. Second, each country 
individually decides whether to ratify the agreement or not. If countries agreed on 
the MPR the agreement enters into force if the MPR is satisfied. If the MPR is not 
satisfied, then the coalition breaks down into singletons. Third, given the MPR is 
satisfied, a transboundary pollution game between the coalition of signatories and 
the non-signatories is played. Else we have a standard transboundary pollution 
game. 
Our analysis shows that an MPR will always improve stability. More precisely, a 
stricter MPR always performs at least as well as a less strict MPR. This does not 
imply that an equilibrium MPR will require the membership of all countries. We 
find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium the MPR will be set at a level that 
allows at least one country to free ride.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the game. 
Section 3 provides the formal analysis of the game and determines key features of 
the equilibrium outcomes. In Section 4 we move to the discussion of our results. 
This section puts our results into a broader perspective and provides further details 
on how our paper is linked to the literature on minimum participation rules. 
Section 5 offers conclusions for international policy coordination.  
                                                 
5
 A number of applied studies on stability of climate agreements have use this type of game, e.g. 
Finus et al. (2005).  
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2 A model of a IEA formation with minimum 
participation 
We consider a 3-stage game with a set N of countries as players. As we wish to 
study coalition formation we assume 3N . The three stages are (i) the 
minimum participation stage, (ii) the coalition formation stage, and (iii) the 
transboundary pollution game. We describe the game in more detail starting from 
the third stage going backwards.   
Stage 3: The transboundary pollution game. At this stage an agreement has 
become binding for the group of signatories S N . The case of failure to reach 
agreement is the special case where S . The signatories, acting as one single 
player, and the non-signatories play a transboundary pollution game. Hence we 
have 1N S  players. Each player j chooses a level of pollution abatement jq . 
We assume a uniformly mixing pollutant, as in the case of greenhouse gases. 
Hence, individual benefits jB  depend on the aggregate level of abatement 
ii N
q q . Abatement costs jC  depend on country j‟s own abatement. We 
assume that benefits are (weakly) concave and costs are (strictly) convex. Payoffs 
of player j (where j is the coalition S or a singleton player i S ) are given by  
(1) ( ) ( )j j j jV B q C q . 
We assume that countries choose abatement levels simultaneously to maximise 
payoffs, i.e. singletons maximise their individual payoff while the coalition 
maximises the aggregate payoff of coalition members. We allow for 
heterogeneous countries, i.e. countries may differ with respect to their benefits 
and cost functions. We assume that the game satisfies the conditions of the formal 
transboundary pollution game described by Folmer and von Mouche (2000) and 
that the pollution is uniformly distributed as mentioned before. Hence we assume 
that abatement is a global public good. Such a transboundary pollution game has a 
unique Nash equilibrium (Folmer and von Mouche 2000, Proposition 2), referred 
to as partial-agreement Nash equilibrium by Chander and Tulkens (1995).   
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage-3 game defines a partition function, i.e. 
for every coalition S N  we have the payoffs for the coalition and for all non-
signatories. We denote country i‟s payoff under coalition S by ( )iV S . The 
coalition payoff is ( )SV S . A sharing rule must be applied to divide ( )SV S  
between the members of S. This will be discussed below.      
Stage 2: Coalition formation. At this stage each country i N  decides whether or 
not to join a unique IEA. Formally, each country i has a binary strategy space with 
strategies {0,1}i . If country i chooses 0i , it will not be member of the 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 077
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IEA; if i chooses 1i , it will be a signatory, i S . The group of signatories 
forms an IEA if and only if the MPR is satisfied. If the MPR is not satisfied, the 
agreement will not be binding and will be irrelevant. Then the transboundary 
pollution game will be played by all countries acting as singletons and payoffs are 
determined by the unique Nash equilibrium of that game. Hence S N  is 
effective if the MPR is satisfied, else it is ineffective.   
Stage 1: Setting the Minimum Participation Rule. We consider heterogeneous 
countries. In general, an MPR uses a set of measureable characteristics of 
countries and it defines a minimum requirement for the aggregate across signatory 
countries for each characteristic. A simple characteristic is “being a sovereign 
state”. This characteristic corresponds to a minimum number of countries, for 
example “55” in the case of the Kyoto protocol. With heterogeneous countries, 
however, setting a minimum number of signatories does not seem to be adequate. 
In our setting, where countries differ with respect to benefits and cost of 
abatement. Therefore a natural characteristic is countries‟ abatement level in the 
non-cooperative (all singletons) Nash equilibrium of the transboundary pollution 
game which reflects countries‟ respective marginal benefits and costs.  
Let iq  denote country i‟s equilibrium abatement level in the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium of the stage-3 game. We refer to the vector i i N
q  as 
benchmark abatement without an effective agreement. In the following we assume 
that an MPR refers to the sum of signatories‟ benchmark abatements. We denote 
the minimum required level of benchmark abatement by q . Hence, the MPR is 
satisfied and coalition S is effective if and only if 
(2) i
i S
q q . 
In our game the MPR is set as follows. A randomly chosen country suggests q  
which the others accept or reject. As in Carraro et al. (2009) we require a 
unanimous decision, i.e. if a single country rejects, then no MPR applies and 
0q .   
3 Analysis 
We conduct the analysis going backward. 
Stage 3. As we have indicated before, the transboundary pollution game at stage 3 
has a unique Nash equilibrium and determines a partition function. The partition 
function provides for any given coalition S N  a coalition payoff ( )SV S  and 
payoffs ( )jV S  for all singleton countries j S . Abatement is a public good in our 
transboundary pollution game. A larger coalition provides more of the public 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 077
6 
good as it internalises more externalities. Overall payoffs increase with coalition 
enlargement. If a player joins a coalition, the larger coalition will receive a larger 
payoff than the initial coalition and the joining player acting separately. 
Moreover, all other singleton countries are also better off. Using the shorthand 
notation { }jS S j , these properties are formally defined as follows.   
DEFINITION 1 (superadditivity): A cartel partition function is 
superadditive if and only if for all coalitions S N  and all \j N S , it 
holds that ( ) ( ) ( )
jS j S j
V S V S V S . 
DEFINITION 2 (positive spillovers): A cartel partition function exhibits 
positive spillovers, if and only if for all coalitions S N  and all 
, \j k N S  with j k , it holds that ( ) ( )j k jV S V S . 
Note that in superadditive cartel games with positive spillovers the grand 
coalition of all players will choose an efficient abatement level and maximise 
overall payoffs. On the basis of what we just argued we can state our first 
result without formal proof. 
RESULT 1 The partition function that results from the transboundary 
pollution game with a uniformly mixing pollutant described before is 
superadditive and exhibits positive spillovers. 
In order to assess individual incentives to participate in a coalition, we need to 
determine how the coalition payoff is shared between members. Following 
Weikard (2009) we assume that a sharing rule is applied that satisfies the Claim 
Rights Condition. This condition requires that every coalition member i S  
receives at least its outside option payoff, i.e. what i would receive under coalition 
\{ }iS S i  if this is feasible. Feasibility is warranted if the coalition payoff is at 
least as large as the sum of the outside option payoffs, i.e. if 
(3) ( ) ( )S i i
i S
V S V S . 
A particular sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition is sharing 
proportional to outside option payoffs. In this case 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
i i
i S
j jj S
V S
V S V S
V S
 
for all i S . However, the remainder of the analysis holds for any sharing rule 
that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition. We refer to this class of sharing rules as 
“optimal sharing rules” for reasons that will become apparent below. 
Stage 2. Now we can move to the coalition formation stage. A Nash equilibrium 
of the coalition formation game is a vector of ratification decisions i i N  such 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 077
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that no single country would prefer to change its decision. We call a coalition S a 
stable coalition if the strategy profile i i N  that corresponds to S is a Nash 
equilibrium. Stability can be decomposed into internal and external stability 
(d‟Aspremont et al. 1983).  
DEFINITION 3  (internal and external stability): 
(i) A coalition S is internally stable if and only if for all i S  it holds 
that 
(4) ( ) ( )i i iV S V S . 
 (ii) A coalition S is externally stable if and only if for all j S  it holds that 
(5) ( ) ( )j j jV S V S . 
(iii) Coalition S  is stable if and only if it is internally and externally 
stable.  
To determine the equilibrium coalitions we proceed in two steps. First we discuss 
internal stability, then external stability. Note that our sharing rule implies that, if 
the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of outside option payoffs, then payoffs can 
always be shared such that the coalition is internally stable. Hence to check 
internal stability it is sufficient to check whether the Claim Rights Condition can 
be satisfied, i.e. to check condition (3). Next notice that if (3) is not satisfied for S, 
then S cannot be internally stable. Hence, sharing rules that satisfy the Claim 
Rights Condition will internally stabilise all coalitions that are possibly internally 
stable (Weikard 2009, Theorem 1). It is in this sense that these sharing rules are 
optimal. Also note that whether (3) holds is determined by the partition function 
alone and therefore it is not necessary to specify the sharing rule. 
A transboundary pollution game with optimal sharing has been examined in 
McGinty (2007), Weikard and Dellink (2008), Nagashima et al. (2009) and 
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2009). The setting in this paper extends the analysis to 
include MPRs. In essence an MPR makes every coalition inadmissible that does 
not meet condition (2), the stated minimum requirements. Suppose coalition S  
forms such that S ii Sq q q  and, hence, S is ineffective. In this case a non-
cooperative transboundary pollution game is played where all countries i N  
choose their benchmark abatements and payoffs are 
( ) ( ) ( )i i j ij NV B q C q . We refer to ( )iV  as country i‟s benchmark 
payoff. 
The following is straightforward.  
RESULT 2  Every ineffective coalition is internally stable. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 077
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Proof. If coalition S is ineffective, then the smaller coalition 
iS  will also be 
ineffective. Hence no country can gain by leaving an ineffective coalition.  
To obtain the next result we introduce the notion of a pivotal country. 
DEFINITION 4  (i) Country i S  is pivotal for an effective coalition S if 
and only if coalition 
iS  is ineffective. 
The next result follows by construction. 
RESULT 3  The outside option payoff of a pivotal member of S is its 
benchmark payoff.  
To determine the impact of an MPR on coalition (internal) stability, we need 
to examine how an MPR affects coalition payoffs and outside option payoffs.   
It holds that  
RESULT 4 Consider a given coalition S and two MPRs, one less strict 
0Lq , the other more strict H Lq q . Moving from Lq  to Hq  will never 
increase coalition payoffs but may reduce them to benchmark payoffs for 
Hq  sufficiently high. 
Proof. If S is ineffective under Lq , nothing changes if Hq  applies instead of 
Lq . Furthermore, if S is effective under Hq , then it will be effective under Lq  
and nothing changes. If, however, L S Hq q q  (S is effective under Lq  but 
ineffective under Hq ), then payoffs will be reduced to benchmark payoffs.  
The next result is the key to understanding how MPRs work in this model. 
RESULT 5  Consider again a given coalition S and two MPRs, 0Lq  and 
H Lq q . Moving from Lq  to Hq  will never increase outside option 
payoffs but may reduce them to benchmark payoffs for Hq  sufficiently 
high. 
Proof. First, if S is ineffective under Lq , nothing changes if Hq  applies 
instead of Lq . Next, recall that country i S  is pivotal if and only if 
iS S
q q q  or equivalently i Sq q q . This implies that an increase of q  
may increase (but never decrease) the number of pivotal countries. If Sq q , 
every country in S is pivotal. As a country becomes pivotal, its outside option 
payoff is the benchmark payoff (RESULT 3) which is lower than the initial 
outside option payoff. The latter holds due to superadditivity and positive 
spillovers. Finally, if Sq q , then S is ineffective and, trivially outside option 
payoffs equal benchmark payoffs.   
The next result follows as a corollary of Results 2 and 5.  
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 077
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RESULT 6  Consider any two MPRs, 0Lq  and H Lq q . Then every 
coalition S that is internally stable under Lq  will also be internally stable 
under Hq . The converse does not hold.  
Proof. First, from RESULT 2, if S is ineffective under Hq  then it will be 
internally stable.  If S is effective under Hq  (and, of course under Lq ), then 
payoffs are unaffected if Hq  applies instead of Lq . Outside option payoff, 
however may fall (see RESULT 5). Hence, moving from Lq  to Hq  may 
internally stabilise S but it will never internally destabilise S.   
Loosely speaking, a stricter MPR will always offer more internal stability 
than a less strict MPR. Of course, an increase of q  may make a given 
coalition S ineffective. However, under a well chosen MPR every possible 
coalition can be stable and effective as the next result shows.  
RESULT 7  With a superadditive partition function, if Sq q , then S is 
effective and internally stable under optimal sharing.  
Proof. It is clear that S is effective. But also every smaller coalition is 
ineffective and, hence, all countries in S are pivotal. By superadditivity it 
holds that ( ) ( )S SV S V . Because every member is pivotal, ( )SV  is the 
sum of the outside option payoffs and condition (3) is satisfied. Therefore 
optimal sharing guarantees internal stability.   
With these results we can move on to examine external stability. Under an 
optimal sharing rule the following result holds  
RESULT 8   A coalition S is externally unstable if and only if there exists 
country j S  such that jS  is internally stable.  
Proof. See Weikard (2009) proof of Lemma 1.   
The next result puts together external and internal stability.  
RESULT 9  Consider any two MPRs, 0Lq  and H Lq q . A move from 
Lq  to Hq   may result in a larger coalition becoming stable. With 
superadditivity and positive spillovers, this will always improve payoffs.   
Proof. This follows immediately from RESULTS 6 and 8. If a move from Lq  to 
Hq  internally stabilises coalition S, then either S is externally stable or, if 
externally unstable, there exist jS  with j S  and jS is internally stable. 
We call jS  an internally stable enlargement of S. The argument can then be 
repeated. Hence, either jS  is externally stable or there exists an internally 
stable enlargement of jS , and so on.  
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Stage 1. With these results in place we can now turn to the minimum 
participation stage. 
Since each country is characterised by iq , we sort countries according to this 
criterion and adopt the following notational convention 1 2 ... nq q q . It 
is only for mathematical convenience that we assume all inequalities to be 
strict. Clearly we have by construction  
RESULT 10   If country i is pivotal in S, then all countries j i  are also 
pivotal in S.  
Notice that, by comparison, in a game with identical countries, as considered 
by Carraro et al. (2009), either all countries or none of the countries are 
pivotal. 
At the minimum participation stage, one country is randomly selected to 
propose the MPR. Then others are asked to accept or reject the proposal. A 
rejection results in 0q . In this case every coalition formed would be 
effective. Hence, a country would reject a proposal if its expected payoff 
under the proposed MPR would be less than the expected payoff under 0q . 
We denote a stable coalition under 0q   by *S . As we will usually find a 
large set of stable coalitions, *jE  denotes the expected payoff if j rejects the 
MPR proposed by i. Hence, we call a proposed MPR “acceptable” if it 
stabilises a coalition where each country receives at least 
*
jE . Obviously an 
equilibrium proposal must be acceptable. We return to this issue below.  
In the remainder of the analysis we assume that the grand coalition is unstable 
under 0q . Else an MPR has no force and the problem is not very 
interesting. 
We know from RESULT 7 that the grand coalition will be internally stable and 
therefore stable under Nq q . Also we know that the grand coalition is 
efficient. The next question then is whether any country can get a higher 
payoff than in the grand coalition. For this it is important to note that 
individual payoffs in the grand coalition depend on outside option payoffs –
note that the Claim Rights Condition must be met. The outside option payoffs 
will, in turn, depend on the MPR. Hence, the country that proposes the MPR 
will determine which countries are pivotal. This will impact the distribution 
of payoffs. Clearly the proposing country prefers to be non-pivotal as pivotal 
countries‟ payoffs are reduced to benchmark payoffs. If a country i is selected 
as proposer, it will try to set an MPR that stabilises the grand coalition such 
that i is non-pivotal while countries j i  are pivotal. This minimises others‟ 
outside option payoff subject to i being non-pivotal. This implies that it could 
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be optimal for the proposing country i to propose N iq q q  rather than 
Nq q . Clearly if i is close to N   most countries will be non-pivotal, the 
sum of outside option payoffs is larger and this strategy will eventually 
undermine the internal stability of N . Still in this case it may be optimal to 
propose N iq q q , provided that this proposal would be acceptable. To fix 
ideas, we first examine the “smallest” country, country 1.  
RESULT 11   If country 1 is the proposer, it proposes 
1Nq q q  
and the grand coalition emerges, provided that this proposal is acceptable 
for all other countries. 
Proof. First notice that all countries other than 1 are pivotal players and their 
outside option payoff is ( )iV . Furthermore, by superadditivity we have 
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )N NV N V N V N  and 1 11
( ) ( )N ii NV N V . Hence condition 
(3) is satisfied and N is internally stable under optimal sharing. As N is 
externally stable by definition, N is stable. In addition, by positive spillovers, 
no other proposal will give a larger payoff to country 1 as it receives at least 
the outside option payoff  1 1( )V N .   
For a randomly selected proposer we have the following result. 
RESULT 12   If country i is the proposer, it proposes 
N iq q q   
provided that this proposal is acceptable by all other countries. 
The grand coalition emerges if and only if 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
i n
N j j jj j i
V N V N V . Otherwise coalition iN  emerges.  
Proof. First notice that all countries j i  are pivotal players for the grand 
coalition. Hence in N they must at least receive their outside option payoff 
( )jV . The non-pivotal countries j i  must receive at least ( )j jV N . Hence 
if 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
i n
N j j jj j i
V N V N V , condition (3) is satisfied and N is 
internally stable under optimal sharing. As N is externally stable by 
definition, N is stable. In addition by positive spillovers, no other proposal 
will give a larger payoff to country i as it receives at least the outside option 
payoff  ( )i iV N . If, however, condition (3) cannot be met under N iq q q , 
then country i can still secure ( )i iV N  by announcing 0i  in the stage 2 
game. Others‟ best response is 1j  for all j i . Hence, coalition iN  is 
formed. iN  is stable as all its members are pivotal under N iq q q .   
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Finally, it remains to be examined whether any country j i  would reject i‟s 
proposal N iq q q . The acceptability of the proposal can be guaranteed 
whenever 
 (6) *( )
i i
N i jj N
V N E . 
This will typically be the case in a superadditive game. If the number of 
countries is sufficiently large, coalitions *S  are “small” compared to 
iN  and 
provide significantly less than the efficient level of abatement. If condition 
(6) is not met, then members of iN  have an incentive to decline i‟s proposal. 
In this case 0q  results and some equilibrium coalition *S  emerges.  
4 Policy coordination and IEAs 
As IEAs are wide-spread and important for environmental policy making we turn 
now to discuss the significance of our theoretical results for environmental policy 
coordination. Also we provide a more in-depth review of previous contributions 
on MPRs in the literature. Even though, as we show, MPRs may have a decisive 
role for the stability of IEAs, only a few previous theoretical contributions exist in 
the literature with an explicit focus on MPRs. Closest to our research are models 
with perfect information. To these we turn first. Then we broaden the scope and 
discuss MPRs under uncertainty and incomplete information about payoff 
structures.  
Rutz (2001) analyses the role of MPRs in the coalition formation game that has 
become canonical for the study of IEAs (Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 
Barrett 1994). In this game a coalition forms at stage 1 and, at stage 2, the 
coalition and the non-signatories play the transboundary pollution game. Rutz 
considers identical countries and shows that the equilibrium number of signatories 
is equal to a number required by an exogenously given MPR. Rubio and Casino 
(2005) introduce a stock pollutant into the game. The partition function is 
generated by a differential game. They consider the effect of MPRs and arrive at 
the same conclusion: once an MPR is established, the size of a stable coalition is 
the number of countries required by the MPR. In these studies the MPR is 
exogenous. Carraro et al. (2009) have extended the model to analyse the 
endogenous choice of an MPR. The MPR is unanimously agreed in the first stage 
of the game. Once the MPR is established, the standard IEA formation game 
follows. Carraro et al. (2009) arrive at the result that there exists (among other 
equilibria) an equilibrium MPR that requires full participation such that the grand 
coalition is stable.  
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Our model is an extension of Carraro et al. (2009). While the basic set-up of our 
game is similar, we allow for heterogeneous players. This is an important step 
towards practical applicability of the theoretical analysis of MPRs. Introducing 
heterogeneous players poses three challenges for the analysis. First, if players 
differ with respect to benefits and costs of abatement, the design of transfer 
schemes (e.g. tradable permits) is an important determinant of the stability of 
coalitions. The benefits from cooperation can be shared in different ways. A 
sharing rule (or transfer scheme) that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition will 
support stability whenever it is feasible. Second, with heterogeneous players, the 
equilibria of the game cannot be described by the number of players anymore. The 
identity of players matters. Third, the different characteristics of players allow for 
the use of different types of MPRs. An MPR may require a minimum number of 
countries, but it may also require some other aggregate characteristics. In our 
analysis we choose for the equilibrium abatement level of countries in the non-
cooperative equilibrium of the transboundary pollution game. This captures the 
“size” of the different countries. Addressing these three challenges together is a 
genuine novelty in the analysis of MPRs.  
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of our results and link them to 
international environmental policy making. 
First notice that, due to superadditivity, an increase in coalition size will always 
increase the gains from cooperation. With a sufficiently strict MPR it is more 
likely to stabilise larger coalitions than in the absence of an MPR (RESULT 9). An 
immediate implication is that a social planner would set an MPR sufficiently strict 
to stabilise the grand coalition. Hence, the result derived by Rutz (2001) 
generalises to heterogeneous countries. Comparing our findings to the results 
obtained by Carraro et al. (2009) we notice a difference. We find, in contrast to 
the result of Carraro et al. (2009), that the equilibrium MPR is generally not 
requiring full participation. The equilibrium proposal will allow the proposing 
country to free-ride on the coalition consisting of all other countries. Still the 
grand coalition will emerge if the country that proposes the MPR is sufficiently 
small as compared to other countries. With identical countries a grand coalition 
emerges in an equilibrium, as found by Carraro et al. (2009).  
Our model underlines the importance of agenda-setting. We model the first stage 
of the game as a simple bargaining game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The 
country that can make a proposal, or sets the agenda, is able to exploit some 
bargaining power. Country i‟s  equilibrium proposal ( N iq q q ) makes i non-
pivotal for the grand coalition. This establishes a larger claim and, hence, a larger 
payoff under any sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition.  
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One interesting implication of our model is that if free-riding occurs in 
equilibrium, it will be a large country that free-rides. The equilibrium proposal of 
a large country ( N iq q q ) makes all smaller countries non-pivotal and 
increases their claims such that condition (3) is not met for the grand coalition. 
The implication of this finding for environmental policy making is that large 
countries‟ power to the set the agenda is more likely to lead to inefficient results 
compared to small countries.    
To summarise our results, we find that MPRs can play a significant role to 
establish successful coalitions that overcome the free-rider problem in the 
provision of public goods. In many cases an efficient grand coalition emerges. In 
some cases a single large player free-rides. Still in a setting with many players the 
largest part of the gains from cooperation can be reaped.  
These optimistic results must be interpreted with care. Our model is a game with 
complete information, i.e. each player is informed about choice options (strategy 
spaces) and payoffs of all other players. However, the long-term environmental 
impacts that an IEA addresses and the technological abatement options are 
generally uncertain. This leads to uncertain payoffs –an issue that hampers, 
presumably, the formation of a global climate agreement. In addition coalition 
formation is a political process and there may be uncertainties about policy 
preferences as well. 
Black et al. (1993) were the first to provide an analysis of the role of MPRs for 
IEAs under uncertainty. They include incomplete information in their model 
assuming that individual countries know their cost function but do not know their 
benefits from the agreement. Black et al. (1993) use this approach in order to 
assess the optimality of MPRs depending on different abatement costs as well as 
the number of participating countries. Countries are assumed to be symmetric and 
the binary choice about coalition formation is made simultaneously, or at least 
without knowledge about the decision of the other countries (Black et al. 1993, p. 
284). Therefore, countries are uncertain about whether a coalition will be formed 
or not. According to the underlying assumptions of the model, coalition formation 
is only possible under the condition that an MPR is incorporated into the treaty. 
The motivation to sign an agreement “is the contribution that added commitment 
makes to the likelihood that the treaty is effected” (Black et al. 1993, footnote 9). 
Under incomplete information about the payoffs the grand coalition might not be 
efficient (individual marginal abatement costs may exceed the sum of expected 
marginal benefits). Therefore, in contrast to our model, a social planer would 
eventually choose a threshold below the grand coalition. 
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Harstad (2006) models uncertainty about the costs and benefits of the provision of 
a public good and discusses incentives for cooperation of heterogeneous countries 
to jointly provide the public good. Flexible participation (open membership) is 
compared with rigid cooperation (full membership) and minimum participation 
rules. The decision about the agreement on the MPR is endogenised assuming 
majority voting on the threshold defined by the MPR. Harstad (2006, proposition 
5) shows that the voting game may not have a Condorcet winner and there may 
not be a stable equilibrium MPR.  
The MPRs of most IEAs require less than full participation. The models of Black 
et al. (1993) and Harstad (2006) explain this by incomplete information and 
uncertainty. In our model less than full participation is explained by the 
bargaining power of the proposing country.  
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we show that the model of endogenous choice of minimum 
participation rules (MPRs) for international environmental agreements (IEAs) 
suggested by Carraro et at. (2009) can be generalised to heterogeneous countries. 
We find that MPRs are an effective tool to stimulate participation in IEAs. The 
grand coalition, full participation, can be established in cases where the country 
that puts a proposal for an MPR on the bargaining table is small. Large countries, 
however, can take a free-rider position if they have bargaining power when the 
MPR is negotiated. This implies that large countries bear a particular 
responsibility in the negotiation process of a new climate agreement. 
Even though our findings shed new light on the formation of IEAs with an MPR, 
there remain open questions. Our model could be extended in various directions. 
An important issue is to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of coalition 
formation, in particular an understanding of the negotiation process (cf. Caparrós 
2004) and of the role of renegotiations (cf. Weikard and Dellink 2008). As 
discussed in the previous section uncertainties are an important determinant of 
IEA formation. Uncertainties may unravel over time. When renegotiations are 
considered, learning becomes an important issue (Ulph 2004, Kolstad 2007). 
Furthermore, signing –and ratifying– an agreement just means that countries 
declare their intention to contribute to the public good. It is an additional step to 
incorporate the treaty into national law. Clearly, the important issue here is 
enforcement. Barrett (2009) argues that the lack of an enforcement mechanism is 
a decisive failure of Kyoto protocol. McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) incorporate 
enforcement into the standard IEA formation game.  
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Models of IEA formation have been looking at these aspects one by one – a 
comprehensive model of IEA formation that combines MPRs, renegotiations and 
enforcement is still missing.  
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